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Waiver in Indiana-A Conflict with the Goals
of the Juvenile Justice System
The doctrine of parens patriae has long been accepted as the basis for
our juvenile justice system.' Indiana has not been unique in its adoption of
this doctrine since throughout the history of the juvenile justice system the
doctrine of parens patriae has been predominant. Under this philosophy the
juvenile court was created to help the child, not to punish him; rehabilitation
not retribution was the key according to the early "child savers" although
much done in the name of rehabilitation included increased governmental
control over the lives of children. 2 The central figure in this plan was the
judge, who was seen as a kindly, patient man, truly concerned with children,3
and who was to play an important role in the reform of the child. As a
fatherly figure' the judge was thought to command respect and be capable of
showing the child what he had done wrong, while still treating him with com-
passion.5
While the goal of the juvenile court was to reform the child it was
recognized that not all children could be rehabilitated. So the juvenile courts
relinquished control over certain offenders and allowed them to be waived for
trial in the criminal court. Thus waiver became the exception to the doctrine
of parens patriae.
Although the rationale behind the waiver policy i.e. if treatment doesn't
work punishment will, has been attacked as being incompatible with the
philosophy of the juvenile justice system, 6 there are other arguments in favor
of waiver which are not inconsistent with the parens patriae notion. By waiv-
ing those juveniles who are considered beyond rehabilitation or who have
committed particularly heinous offenses, the juvenile justice system is able to
separate other juveniles who are incarcerated from the hardened delinquent.
'IND. CODE § 31-5-7-1- (1976) The purpose of this act is to secure for each child within its
provisions such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will serve the child's
welfare and the best interests of the state; and when such child is removed from his own family,
to secure for him custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which
should have been given by his parents.
2Platt, The Rise of the Child-Saving Movement: A Study in Social Policy and Correctional
Reform, 381 ANNALS 21 (1969).
SMack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909).
4Chapter 237, Section 1, Indiana General Law 1903. Early Indiana law even required the
judge to be a parent and not less than 40 years of age.
5The task demanded the sympathetic and friendly methods of a tribunal that could mix
law with social work: of a judge who would not merely measure the lawbreaker's debt .to society
and require that he pay it, but who would preside over a program of treatment aimed at supply-
ing the offender with the ability to live in conformity with the law. See Note, Juvenile Delin-
quents: The Police, State Courts and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775 (1966).
9Sargent and Gordon, Waiver ofJuridiction: An Evaluation of the Process in the Juvenile
Court, 9 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 121, 124 (1963).
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In the case of repeat offenders who have committed serious offenses such as
murder or assault with a deadly weapon there is also a legitimate fear of
unleashing such persons on society in a few years, since the juvenile court can
only incarcerate them until their twenty-first birthday.
But while the alternative of waiver to adult court and a criminal convic-
tion may protect the public, it is not without its costs. Laws governing waiver
must be carefully drafted in order to remain compatible with the parens
patriae doctrine. To the extent that only those children who are beyond the
help of the juvenile court are waived to adult criminal court, the doctrine of
parens patriae and waiver are compatible. However when waiver laws are
overly broad they conflict with the underlying philosophy of the juvenile
justice system.
The problem thus facing the juvenile court is under what circumstances
the court should relinquish its protective jurisdiction over the child and allow
him to be tried in the adult criminal court. It has been suggested that as
judges became disillusioned with their failure to reform delinquent children
by friendly counselling, stern warnings, probation or detention in training
schools, they decided punishment was the only effective means of dealing with
juvenile crime.'
The response to the problem often has been to specify by statute when
waiver is permissable.1 But even a well drafted waiver statute" can work at
odds with the juvenile justice system if it is not properly followed. The courts
must carefully weigh the factors the legislature had determined should govern
waiver. Yet other factors not expressed by the court will often influence its
decision to waive jurisdiction. Certain offenses such as murder, rape or
assault may arouse the public opinion against the defendantY The child's age
at the time of the offense may play an important part in the waiver decision,
it is usually the older teenager charged with a serious offense who is waived, 10
even though in many states the child is subject to waiver at the age of four-
teen" or fifteen.1 2 The popular cries of "law and order" and "crime in the
'Parker, Juvenile Delinquency-Transfer of Juvenile Cases to Adult Courts-Factors to Be
Considered Under the Juvenile Delinquents Act, 48 CANADIAN BAR REv. 336 (1970).
8D.C. CODE § 6-2307, COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-104 (Cumm. Supp. 1975). IND. CODE §
31-5-7-14 (1976). (On February 16, 1978 the Indiana General Assembly passed House Bill 1028
which will become effective on October 1, 1979. This bill will be the new Indiana Juvenile Code.
However the interim period will be used to study the problems under the present law and propos-
ed changes. This note will deal with criticisms of the present Indiana waiver law, IND. CODE
31-5-7-14 (1976) and will present alternatives).
gPeuler, Juveniles Tried As Adults: Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 3 J. CONTEMP.
L. 349, 357-58 (1977).
10Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583,
592 (1968).
1(a) Whenever a child fourteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which
would amount to a crime if committed by an adult, the judge, upon motion by the
prosecuting attorney and after full investigation and hearing may waive jurisdiction
and order such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which
would have jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult, if the court finds
[Vol. 53:601
JUVENILE JUSTICE
streets" may also have influenced the judges and helped to increase the in-
cidence of waiver.
that there is probable cause to believe that the offense has specific prosecutive
merit, that the child is beyond rehabilitation under the regular statutory juvenile
system, that it is in the best interest of public welfare and security he stand trial as
an adult and that the offense is either:
(1) heinous or of an aggravated character (greater weight being given to offenses
against the person than to offenses against property); or
(2) part of a repetitive pattern of offenses, even though less serious in nature
(b) Whenever a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with any of the following
offenses which would amount to a crime if committed by an adult: second degree
murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, malicious mayhem, commis-
sion of a felony while armed, inflicting injury in the commission of a felony, rob-
bery, first degree burglary, aggravated assault and battery, or assault and battery
with intent to commit any of the felonies enumerated in this subsection, the
juvenile court upon motion by the prosecuting attorney shall after full investigation
and hearing, waive jurisidiction and order such child held for trial under the
regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of the offense if com-
mitted by an adult unless the court finds that either:
(1) there is probable cause to believe the offense does not have specific prosecutive
merit; or
(2) it would be in the best interest of the child and of public welfare and public
security for the juvenile to remain with the regular statutory juvenile system.
IND. CODE § 31-5-7-14 (1976).
1(a) If a child fifteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which would
amount to a crime if committed by an adult, the judge, upon motion by the
prosecuting attorney and after full investigation and hearing may waive jurisdiction
and order such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which
would have jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult, if the court finds
that the offense has specific prosecutive merit and either;
(1) it is heinous or of an aggravated character, greater weight being given to of-
fenses against the person than to offenses against property
(2) even though less serious, if the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of juvenile
offenses which would lead to a determination that the juvenile may be beyond
rehabilitation under regular statutory juvenile procedure
(3) it is in the best interest of the public welfare or for the protection of the public
security generally that the juvenile be required to stand trial as an adult
offender
(b) If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with any of the following offenses
which would amount to a crime if committed by an adult: second degree murder,
voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, malicious mayhem, armed robbery,
robbery, first degree burglary, aggravated assault and battery with intent to com-
mit any of the felonies enumerated in this subsection, the juvenile court upon mo-
tion of the prosecuting attorney shall after full investigation waive jurisdiction and
order such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which
would have jurisdiction of the offense if committed by an adult unless the court
finds that:
(1) the offense if not heinous or of an aggravated character, greater weight being
given to offenses against the person than to offenses against property
(2) the offense is not part of a repetitive pattern of juvenile offenses which would
lead to a determination that the juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation under
the regular statutory juvenile procedures
(3) it would be in the best interest of the child and of public welfare and public
security for the juvenile to remain with the regular statutory juvenile system.
IND. CODE § 31-5-7-14 (1976).
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No matter what factors play a part in the waiver decision, the outcome
may be severe. Juveniles tried as adults often encounter drastic conse-
quences.1 s "[T]he decision to relinquish jurisdiction moved the juvenile from
the rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile court to the regular criminal pro-
cesses, where the notions of retribution and deterrence play an important
role.' 4
This note will trace the development of waiver in Indiana through case
law and legislative attempts to define waiver. Criticisms of the present law
and possible alternatives will be explored.
THE COURTS' RESPONSE TO WAIVER
Since the decision to waive jurisdiction is of such critical importance, the
juvenile court and the legislature must choose carefully which factors to con-
sider. "The criteria should reflect not only the interests of the community,
but also fairness to the troubled youth and consideration for his needs."15 The
Supreme Court recognized the need to balance the child's welfare with the
best interests of the state in Kent v. United States. '6
When faced with the issue of which procedural rules must be enforced
during a juvenile court waiver hearing in order to insure that constitutional
rights of due process and fairness were not denied the juvenile, the Supreme
Court declared: "the admonition to function in a 'parental' relationship is not
an invitation to procedural arbitrariness."' 7 The Court was concerned that
the child would recieve the worst of both worlds since he was given neither
the protections accorded to adults nor the "solicitous care and regenerative
treatment" intended for children. 8 The Court strengthed the District of Col-
umbia statute' 9 which required a pre-waiver hearing by insisting upon a com-
plete investigation of the facts of the alleged offense to determine whether the
sAn example is Tilton v. Commonwealth, where the seventeen-year-old defendant after be-
ing certified to stand trial in adult criminal court was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. The most severe sentence available to the juvenile court was four years in the State Boys'
School. Tilton v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 774, 85 S.E.2d 368 (1955).
"4Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another Pro-
posal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1172 (1966).
15Peuler, supra note 9, at 358.
16383 U.S. 541 (1966).
"Id. at 555.
"Id. at 556.
"Id. at 544.
The District of Columbia Code involved in this case was not as specific in listing which children
would be subject to waiver. However the general scope and intent of the D.C. waiver law very
similar to present Indiana law:
If a child 16 years or older is charged with an offense which would amount to a felony in the case of
an adult, or any child charged with an offense which if committed by an adult is punishable by
death or life imprisonment, the judge may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and order
such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction
of such offense if committed by an adult; or such other court may exercise the powers conferred
upon the juvenile court in this sub-chapter in conducting and disposing of cases.
D.C. CODE § 11-914 (1961).
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parens patriae plan would be more desirable and appropriate in the case.20
However the Court did not go so far as to require that all the constitutional
guarantees of adults be applied in the juvenile courts. Since the juvenile court
has certain built-in rights and immunities21 the Court felt that only those
rights which are necessary to insure due process and fairness must be granted
in the juvenile court. The Court also recognized that since waiver denies a
child these protections he is entitled to counsel,22 access to the social records
and probation reports which are to be considered by the court, 23 and, most
importantly, to a statement of reasons for the decision to waive. 2 '
The Supreme Court in Kent made it clear that waiver orders merely
stating that the judge had, after a full investigation, decided to waive the
juvenile, would no longer be acceptable. The Court did not, however, offer
any guidelines as to what would constitute a full investigation or what reasons
given by the juvenile court judge to support the waiver decision would be ac-
ceptable. A list of suggested determinative factors for waiver was prepared by
the juvenile judge for the District of Columbia and was included in an appen-
dix to the Court's opinion. 21 However the Court gave no indication of its
views as to the propriety of these criteria. These criteria were later adopted in
whole or in part in court opinions in many jurisdictions, including Indiana.2 6
Since the only specific guidelines as to which factors should be considered in
20383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
"'Those rights which the court in Kent felt were already part of the juvenile justice system
were (1) the juvenile offender was shielded from publicity, (2) he was rarely detained with adults,
(3) he could only be detained until he reached the age of twenty-one, (4) the juvenile court was
admonished to give preferance to retaining a child in the custody of his parents, and (5) a
juvenile court conviction carried no stigma such as loss of civil rights and disqualification from
public employment. Id. at 556.
2 The court cited the earlier case of Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104, 106. "The need
for counsel is even greater in the adjudication of waiver since it contemplates the imposition of
criminal sanctions." Id. at 553.21The court cited the earlier case of Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d 278, 282 )1964)
and accepted the appellate court's view. "The child's attorney must be advised of the information
upon which the Juvenile Court relied in order to assist effectively in the determination of the
waiver question, by insisting upon the statutory command that waiver can be ordered only after
'full investigation', and by guarding against action of the Juvenile Court beyond its discretionary
authority." Id. at 559.
24383 U.S. at 558 (1966).
21383 U.S. at 566 (1966).
26The Indiana Supreme Court adoted these criteria in Summers v. State, 248 Ind. 551, 230
N.E.2d 320 (1967) and Atkins v. State, 259 Ind. 596, 290 N.E.2d 441 (1972). Those factors
which were to be considered by the juvenile court judge in making his determination whether to
waive the offense were: (1) the seriousness of the alleged offense, (2) whether the alleged offense
was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner. . .. (3) whether the
alleged offense was against persons or property. . ., (4) the prosecutive merit of the complaint. ...
(5) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court where the juvenile's
associates in the alleged offense are adults.. .. (6) the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile.
(7) the record and previous history of the juvenile. . .. (8) the prospects for adequate pro-
tection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile. 383 U.S.
566-67 (1966).
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the waiver were not even part of the Court's decision there remained uncer-
tainties as to what form a juvenile waiver hearing should take. All that was
clear was the intention of the Supreme Court to comport with the doctrine of
parens patriae by making criminal trial in adult court the excepton rather
than the rule for juvenile offenders.27
After the broadly stated doctrine in Kent that a hearing "must measure
up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment" 28 the Indiana Supreme
Court translated that doctrine into rules governing waiver in Indiana in Sum-
mers v. State. 29 The Indiana Supreme Court held as in Kent that the juvenile
court had to accompany its waiver order with a list of the reasons why the
waiver was granted in order to permit a reivew of the waiver decision.3 0 These
guidelines, however, were not exclusive, according to the court, thus leaving a
large amount of discretion in the hands of the juvenile court judge.31 At first
glance, the Summers decision seemed to be an echoing of the Kent decision
with the same guidelines as set forth in the appendix in the Kent case.3 2
However the Summers case went beyond Kent in several important respects.
The court in Summers held that the prosecutor could petition for waiver
when he believed the case had "prosecutive merit."33 This added procedure,
not authorized by the Juvenile Court Act of 1945, allows a great amount of
discretion on the part of the prosecutor. No longer did the juvenile court
judge exercise the sole power to decide which juveniles would be considered
for waiver.3 4
Five years after Summers the Indiana Supreme Court was again called
upon to review the propriety of a juvenile waiver. In Atkins v. State35 the
court reaffirmed the holding in Summers that the waiver order must clearly
state the reasons for the waiver. The court also noted that there is a presump-
27Peuler, supra note 9 at 351.
28Schornhorst, supra note 10, at 591.
21248 Ind. 551, 230 N.E.2d 320 (1967).
30 [I]t is incumbent upon the Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver order with a
statement of the reasons or considerations therefor. . . . the statement while not
necessarily including a conventional finding of facts, should be sufficient to
demonstrate unequivocally that the strict statutory requirement of a full investigation
and hearing has been met and that a conscientious determination of the question of
waiver has been made. We require that the reasons for the order of waiver ahould be
stated with sufficient specificity to permit a meaningful review.
Id. at 559-60, 230 N.E.2d at 325.
31248 Ind. at 560, 230 N.E.2d at 325 (1967).
32According to Summers a juvenile case may be waived if: (1) the offense has specific pro-
secutive merit in the opinion of the prosecuting attorney; (2) if the offense is heinous or of an ag-
gravated character (greater weight being given to offenses against person than to offenses against
property); (3) if the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of juvenile offenses which would lead to
a determination that said juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation; (4) or if it is in the best interest
of public welfare for protection of the public security. Id. at 561, 230 N.E.2d at 325.
'Isd. at 561-2, 230 N.E.2d at 326 (1967).
s
4See note 54 infra & text accompanying; note 64 infra & text accompanying.
35259 Ind. 596, 290 N.E.2d 441 (1972).
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tion in favor of dealing with the juvenile offender within the juvenile system
and that waiver should be used only as a last resort.a6
One of the most important features of the Atkins case was an attempt to
clarify prosecutive merit. To meet the requirement of prosecutive merit the
prosecutor, according to the court in Atkins, has to show more than a will-
ingness to prosecute. There must also be reason to believe that the case
should be prosecuted in adult court.31
The Atkins decision was followed by a long line of cases which further
defined the juvenile's rights at the waiver hearing.38 These were further at-
tempts to clarify the factors which the juvenile court judge could consider in
making his decision, the movement being towards less prosecutorial discretion
and more concern with the effects of waiver on the child. In Clemons v.
State" the appellate court construed the 1945 waiver law as to require the
juvenile court to necessarily consider the nature of the offense, whether it is
part of a repetitive pattern of juvenile offenses, whether the child is beyond
rehabilitation under the juvenile justice system, and whether waiver is
necessary to protect the public security. 40
The presumption in favor of dealing with delinquents within the juvenile
system led to an additional restriction on waiver. The juvenile court was re-
quired to show that its resources had been exhausted before the juvenile
could be certified to the adult court. 41 The appellate court in State v. Seay4l
rejected the argument that since the sanction of commitment to the Boys
School was not available due to the age of the defendant he should be tried
in adult court. 43 Since other sanctions are available the juvenile court must
specify the reasons for the conclusion that these alternative dispositions are
without merit. 44 But the court in Seay did not go so far as to reqire that the
juvenile court specifically refer to each and every conceivable disposition and
give reasons why that particular method was not chosen.45
As the trend of the Indiana courts seemed to limit waivers, defense
counsel also began to raise the argument that the 1945 Indiana waiver law
6Id. at 598, 290 N.E.2d at 442 (1972).
17id. at 599, 290 N.E.2d at 443 (1972).
"Garst v. State, - Ind. App. - , 361 N.E.2d 934 (1977); Swinehart v. State, -
Ind. App. - , 349 N.E.2d 224 (1976); Imel v. State, - Ind. App. - , 342 N.E.2d 897
(1976); Cartwright v. State, - Ind. App. - , 344 N.E.2d 83 (1976); Duvall v. State, -
Ind. App. - , 353 N.E.2d 478 (1976); Seay v. State, __ Ind. App. - , 377 N.E.2d 489
(1975); State v. Jump, - Ind. App...., 309 N.E.2d 148 (1974); Ingram v. State, - Ind.
App. - , 310 N.E.2d 903 (1974).
3. Ind. App. - , 517 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1974).4 0 d.
4"Seay v. State, Ind. App. , 537 N.E.2d at 499 (1975).
4"Id.
4. Ind. App. - , 337 N.E.2d at 495 (1975).
4._.._ Ind. App. - , 337 N.E.2d at 495-96 (1975). The other sanctions available in-
clude probation, referral to a youth services bureau, commitment to a state hospital, or commit-
ment to a community run drug treatment program.
4'Cartwright v. State, - Ind. App. - , 344 N.E.2d 83 (1976).
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was unconstitutional. However the law was upheld against claims that it was
void for vagueness and in violation of equal protection or due process." In
the same decision, the court of appeals strengthened the presumption in favor
of juvenile jurisdiction by placing the burden upon the state to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that juvenile jurisdiction should be waived.4 7
Despite the fact that the 1975 amendment took effect on July 29, 1975,
the Indiana courts still had before them several cases dealing with the waiver
statute as it appeared prior to the amendment." The appellate court in
Duvall v. State" held that the waiver hearing was required even if noone con-
cerned wanted the hearing.' 0 Neither the defendant, his parents, nor his at-
torney could waive the hearing and request that the case be tried in adult
criminal court. Failure to hold the hearing would result in reversal of the
criminal court conviction, and not merely a remand for proper waiver pro-
ceedings. The court stated: "(a)lthough the exclusive jurisdiction of the
juvenile court inures to the benefit of the juvenile, it is nevertheless the
court's jurisdiction." 5' Thus, a "stipulation" or consent to waive juvenile
jurisdiction does not relieve the juvenile court from its duty to independently
and conscientiously determine the appropriateness of waiver.5 2 It seems more
likely, however, that the court was most concerned with the possibility of the
juvenile not understanding the consequences of his consent to waiver rather
than being concerned with usurpation of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
Finally, the court declared that evidentiary support for a waiver order may
not be obtained from what transpired in the criminal court nor by the pre-
sentence investigaton report if the case was first erroneously tried in the
criminal court and then remanded to the juvenile court for a waiver hear-
ing.'3
The appellate court in Swinheart v. State'4 felt compelled to comment on
the 1975 amendment even though the case before it was governed by the
earlier law becaue the defendant raised the objection that the 1975 amend-
ment had been applied to him rather than the law as it existed at the time
the alleged crime was committed. The court dismissed this claim by noting
46Imel v. State, - Ind. App. - , 342 N.E.2d 897 (1976). Another recent case, which
was still required to be decided under the 1945 Indiana waiver law rather than the amended
waiver law, said the waiver law also did not violate the defendant's protection against double
jeopardy. Murphy v. State, - Ind. App. - , 364 N.E.2d 770 (1977).
_ Ind. App. - , 342 N.E.2d at 902 (1976).
"Garst v. State, - Ind. App. - , 361 N.E.2d 934 (1977). Imel v. State, - Ind.
App. - , 342 N.E.2d 897 (1976). Cartwright v. State, Ind. App. - , 344 N.E.2d 83
(1976). Duvall v. State, - Ind. App. - , 353 N.E.2d 478 (1976). Swinehart v. State, -
Ind. App. , 349 N.E.2d 224 (1976).
"__ Ind. App. - , 353 N.E.2d 478 (1976).
'OId. at 480-1 Galanti, Survey of Recent Developments, Juveniles, 10 IND. L. REv. 189
(1976).
51353 N.E.2d 478, 481.
1.. Ind. App. - , 353 N.E.2d 478, 481 (1976).
"See Harden v. State, 260 Ind. 501, 296 N.E.2d 784 (1973).
6, Ind. App. - , 349 N.E.2d 224 (1976).
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that "the case law applicable at the time of the alleged theft was identical to
the statute which Swinehart claims was retroactively applied."" The court of
appeals went on to express its concern that while the rationale behind the
new waiver law was to codify the language in Atkins and Summers" waiver in
those cases remained discretionary while under the new law waiver for sixteen
year olds accused of serious felonies is virtually assured.5 7 The criteria in
Summers, Atkins, and the cases which followed required the juvenile court to
consider several factors such as the nature of the offense, the best interests of
the child, the possibility of rehabilitating the child, the maturity of the child,
and the public welfare. It was not sufficient to find and base the waiver deci-
sion upon just one of these factors."s
THE LEGISLATURE'S RESPONSE TO WAIVER-THE 1975 AND 1976 AMENDMENTS
A major change under the 1975 and 1976 amendments was an abandon-
ment of the presumption in favor of dealing with juveniles within the juvenile
system. Some criticism was raised that the legislature may have been over-
reacting in a punitive way to children alleged to have committed violent
acts.59
Under the 1976 amendment it is only necessary for the prosecutor to
show that the child is beyond rehabilitation, and that it is in the best interests
of the public welfare that the juvenile be tried as an adult, and either that
the crime was heinous or part of a repetitive pattern of juvenile offenses." s
If the discretionary waiver provision of the present waiver law61 seems to
make it difficult for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over a juvenile,
the mandatory waiver provisions6 2 for certain "serious offenses" make it nearly
impossible for the court to do so. The juvenile court must find that the of-
fense does not have prosecutive merit or that it would be in the best interest
of public welfare and public security for the juvenile to remain within the
juvenile system.85
The legislature added commission of a felony while armed and infliction
of injury in the commission of a felony to the list of offenses for which waiver
is mandatory in the 1976 law. If the legislature intends to fulfill the stated
5. Ind. App. - , 349 N.E.2d 224, 226 (1976).
5'Another recently decided case, Murphy v. State, 364 N.E.2d 770, 771 (1977) reached the
same conclusion, that the 1945 waiver law was amended to bring it in to compliance with Sum-
mers.
5'Fox, Survey-Domestic Relations Waiver ofJuveniles to Adult Criminal Court, 9 IND. L.
REV. 197, 234 (1975).
BS.... Ind. App. - N.E.2d at 935 (1977).
"See Hopson, Public Law 296, Confused Step in the Wrong Direction, ANNUAL SURVEY OF
IND. LAw 1974-75, at 227.
60IND. CODE § 31-5-7-14(a) (1976).
811d.
'
2IND. CODE § 31-5-7-14(b) (1976).
43See Hopson, supra note 59, at 227.
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purpose of the juvenile justice system8' it should not remove any juvenile from
the reach of the juvenile court. The legislature seems to have ignored its
stated goal of providing the child with the kind of care and discipline he
would have received at home when it enacted the 1976 amendment to the
waiver law.
The major criticism of the present approach is that it puts certain classes
of offenses in the criminal court upon the prosecutor's motion with the option
to transfer to juvenile court.65 However transfer to juvenile court will seldom
if ever occur. If the experience in California with discretionary transfer to the
juvenile court is indicative 6 a large increase in the number of juveniles tried
in adult courts can be expected, a result which seems to be exactly the intent
of the legislature. While on the one hand moving juveniles into the adult
court system gives them additional procedural protections not available in the
juvenile system,67 the wide discretion in the disposition of the child after con-
viction which the juvenile courts enjoy will be lost.
If the goal of the legislature in adopting a waiver allocation by statute
was to restrict discretion they have clearly adopted the wrong method. Alloca-
tion by statute tends merely to place the discretion in the hands of the pro-
secutor rather than the juvenile court judge. Such "prosecutorial discretion is
without adequate procedural check."6 8 The prosecutor is not required to hold
a hearing before he decides whether to file a waiver petition. And since the
prosecutor's main function is to enforce the law his view of whether a juvenile
may respond to treatment is colored.6 9 The proseutor's decision as to which
offense to charge a juvenile with and thereby seek waiver may be distorted if
the offense has aroused public opinion; "well publicized cases usually result in
pressure on the juvenile authorities to permit prosecution in the adult
criminal courts". 7° Furthermore, failure to obtain a conviction for the crime
64IND. CODE § 31-5-7-14 (1976).
"This approach concerned the court of appeals in State v. Jump when they rejected the
state's argument and held that it was not erroneous to retain jurisdiction in the juvenile court
when the offense was serious. In fact the court said, "[t]o adopt it [the state's argument] would
be to require all juveniles to be waived to the criminal court for trial upon serious charges
without regard to the purpose of the juvenile law concerning treatment and rehabilitation as ex-
pressed in Atkins." - Ind. App. - , 309 N.E.2d at 149 (1974).
"Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another Pro-
posal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1181 (1966). The California Statute referred to is § 604 which
requires that any proceeding in any court against a child under the age of 18 shall be suspended
and a certification of such action sent to the juvenile court along with a copy of the pleadings fil-
ed against the child. The juvenile court must then decide whether to consider the case in juvenile
court or order the proceedings to be continued in the original court.
67The right of jury trial is not available in the juvenile courts. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528 (1971).
"Whitebread and Baly, Transfer Between Courts: Proposals of the Juvenile Justice Stan-
dards Project, 63 VA. L. REv. 221, 240.
"Id. at 240-41.
1Juvenile Deliquents: The Police, State Courts and Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L.
REv. 775, 793 (1966).
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charged does not end the criminal court's jurisdiction and send the case back
to the juvenile court; the criminal court retains jurisdiction over lesser includ-
ed offenses,, even if that offense would not have placed the child in the
criminal court in the first place.
When read in conjunction with the 1975 amendment of Indiana Code
31-5-7-3-(b)(1) the present waiver law has an even more profound effect.
Under Indiana Code 31-5-7-23 "no child shall be detained in any prison, jail
or lockup . . ." However, with the 1975 amendment to Indiana Code
31-5-7-3(b)(1), a child tried for murder is now excluded from the definition
of a child, so it is possible for a ten year old child accused of murder to be
tried under the new waiver law in adult court and upon conviction to be im-
prisoned with adults."
The present law does not even require a showing of probable cause that
an offense has been committed by the child before the waiver hearing. And,
parallel to the situation where no conviction is obtained, once waived to the
adult court the child remains in the criminal court's jurisdiction even if he is
found guilty of a lesser included offense that would not have required has
waiver in the first place. Thus under the present law a child could be charg-
ed with first degree murder which would place him automatically in the
criminal court's jurisdiction. The child, if then found guilty of invouluntary
manslaughter, would remain in the criminal court's jurisdiction, subject to
the punishment that court decides to impose. Yet the crime of involuntary
manslaughter is not among the many crimes listed under the mandatory
waiver provision of the present law.
There are, however, a few aspects of the new law which still restrict
waiver. First, the juvenile court judge could refuse to file a petition against
the child and instead handle the case informally so that the prosecutor could
never request a waiver order. Even if a petiton is filed against the child and
the prosecutor requests waiver the decision by the juvenile court to retain
jurisdiction is not reviewable; the state may not appeal the decision. 2
Another restriction on waiver is that even if the judge wants to waive the
case, only the prosecutor can initiate the waiver proceeding; thus, unless the
prosecutor files a motion for waiver, the juvenile court must retain jurisdic-
tion. 7 3
Another consideration is whether the Indiana law in fact operates as har-
shly against juveniles as it might. This of course will depend to a large part
on the prosecutors' office in each county and their policy regarding waiver. 74
"Fox, supra note 57, at 234.
"State ex rel. Hunter v. Juvenile Ct., - Ind. App. - , 309 N.E.2d 148 (1974).
"3See Hopson, supra note 59, at 234.
"In Monroe County at least, some of the fears expressed by critics of stautory allocation of
waiver have not materialized. Waiver to adult court is still the exception rather than the rule so
that the claim that the new law would mean virtually all juveniles would be handled in adult
criminal court is unfounded. In Monroe County about ten per cent of all juveniles have been
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There is no guarantee that counties will not seek waiver in every juvenile case
that they can nor is there any guarantee that present forbearance will con-
tinue. The potential for abandoning the parens patriae philosophy of the
juvenile justice system in favor of waiver and the retributive principle of the
adult court remains. The Indiana legislature should reconsider whether it
wants to replace the philosophy in favor of rehabilitating the juvenile rather
than punishing him. If the legislature decides to adopt a punishment model,
and there are those who feel that that is the only way to handle the problem
of juvenile crime, it should not do so while publicly claiming to be trying to
provide care and treatment for the child. The present waiver law neither
serves as a punishment model nor does it allow the juvenile court to retain
jurisdiction over all those children who could be rehabilitated. 5
CRITICISMS AND ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
There are alternatives available other than a complete reconsideration of
our entire juvenile code, which may be necessary, but which is likely to take
several years to complete. Legislation and the ABA's Transfer Standards Pro-
ject provide examples.
If a juvenile commits a crime in New Jersey he has a hearing which is
very similar to a trial, in that counsel is present and all rules of evidence are
followed. If the juvenile is found guilty he is sentenced to the same term as
an adult, but the juvenile has a right to be freed whenever he is sufficiently
rehabilitated to assume a normal role in society.76 While this no transfer plan
would seem preferable to our arbitrary statutory allocation which carves out
certain offenses for automatic waiver with no consideration given to the in-
dividual youth, this method is also subject to criticism. "While a true no
transfer system might promote apparent equality of treatment among those of
the same age it would also help to insure that the treatment received by all
was equally bad. Any equality would be equality of disadvantage."77 Under a
no transfer system if the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction is set
low the youths are hurt because they are denied treatment rather than
waived to adult court. This figure has not increased significantly since the new law went into ef-
fect. It is now however the policy of the Monroe County Prosecutor's office to seek more waivers
due to the number of repeat offenders and the public outcry for law and order. The prosecutors
do not seek waiver for every case under the mandatory waiver section because they still consider
other factors such as the maturity and sophistication of the child, his previous record, and the in-
terest of the child and the public welfare. Waiver is not determined solely by the nature of the
offense. Seldom does the Monroe County prosecutor's office ask for the maximum penalty against
a juvenile offender, particularly if it is a first offense. Also the concern about the limited number
of dispositions available to the adult criminal court is not as great since many convictions result
in probation just as they would in the juvenile court. Yet, children stll can be sent to prison from
Monroe County once they have been convicted of a crime in the adult criminal court. And it has
been suggested that juveniles sent to prison tend only to learn to be efficient criminals. Interview
with Robert Beck, Deputy Prosecutor, Monroe County, (Sept. 15, 1977).
"See note 64 supra & text accompanying.
"N.J. REv.,STAT. 6:9-1(b) (1952).
"Whitebread and Baly, supra note 68 at 239.
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punishment at an early age. But if the age criterion for juvenile court
jurisdiction is set too high the juvenile court is forced to treat people in-
capable of benefitting from its treatment.
Another plan which is preferable to that enacted by our legislature wa
suggested by the ABA's Transfer Standards Project." The main purpose of
these proposals was to insure that "only extraordinary juveniles in extraor-
dinary factual situations [are] transferred to the criminal court."79 The plan
attempts to limit the incidence of waiver by requiring: 1) probable cause to
believe the juvenile committed an offense, that, if committed by an adult
would be punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than twenty years
and 2) clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile is not amenable to
juvenile court treatment.
Although it is doubtful that our legislature would adopt one of these
alternative plans, that does not mean the legislature cannot or should not
revise the present law.
While it is beneficial to have specific standards regarding waiver set out,
as in the new Indiana law, it seems the legislature has taken the wrong ap-
proach- the presumption should still be in favor of juvenile jurisdiction if the
parens patriae philosophy of the juvenile court is to continue. Waiver and the
parens patriae doctrine are only compatible when waiver laws do not exclude
those children who can be helped from the juvenile court and when the
juvenile court does not try to retain jurisdiction over children who are
hopelessly beyond the court's reach. Indiana's present law has not yet reached
the balance necessary between the two doctrines.
The legislature should amend our present waiver law to require a show-
ing of probable cause that the child has committed the offense charged and
should require a child to be returned to the juvenile court for disposition if
the child is found guilty in the criminal court of a lesser included offense that
is not one of the crimes included in the mandatory waiver section. This would
limit the prosecutor's discretion in filing exaggerated charges in order to br-
ing the child within the jurisdiction of the criminal court and would afford
the juvenile court a greater opportunity to deal with those children who the
legislature and the juvenile court have determined are not beyond the reach
of the juvenile court.
The discretionary waiver provision allows the child to be sent to the adult
criminal court when it can be shown that the offense has specific prosecutive
merit and one of the other specified factors is present. However it is not at all
clear what is meant by specific prosecutive merit. In almost every instance a
prosecutor can show that a case should be prosecuted for one reason or
another. If the legislature intended to adopt the earlier court interpretation
798 nstitute of Judicial Administrators and the ABA Joint Commission of Juvenile Justice
Standards, Transfer Between Courts (Proposed Draft 1976). For an excellent discussion of this
project, see Whitebread and Baly, supra note 59.
79Whitebread and Baly, supra note 68, at 222.
1978]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
of prosecutive merit it could have done so in a much clearer manner by mak-
ing the court's definition of the term "prosecutive merit" a part of the statute.
This vague term tends only to increase the prosecutor's already broad discre-
tion.
Indiana's present waiver law requires the waiver of those children who
have committed violent crimes against people. 80 However the present waiver
law also requires mandatory waiver for such crimes as malicious mayhem,
robbery, and first degree burglary.81 While these are serious crimes against
property, they are not the kind of crimes which indicate that the child is
beyond the help of the juvenlie court. In order for our waiver law to be com-
patible with the long accepted parens patriae philosophy of the juvenile court
system it must be amended to allow more certainty that those children we
decide must be waived to the adult court are truly beyond the rehabilitative
care of the juvenile court.
CONCLUSION
While the parens patriae doctrine has long been the theory behind our
treatment model in the juvenile justice system, it has also been recognized
that not all children can be rehabilitated. Thus waiver to adult court became
the accepted method of handling these children and became a valid excep-
tion to the parens patriae plan. The legislature provided waiver laws with few
if any guidelines as to who could be waived and what procedural re-
quirements must.be met. And so the courts in Indiana, as in many other
jurisdictions, set minimum requirements in order to insure that waiver re-
mained the exception so that the legislature's stated purpose to secure the
custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which
should have been given by his parents, was fulfilled. In an attempt to incor-
porate the case law within its waiver law, the Indiana legislature amended the
waiver law in 1975 and 1976. However the effect of these amendments was to
broaden rather than limit the grounds for waiver and to make waiver man-
datory when a child has been charged with certain offenses regardless of the
child's potential for rehabilitation. The result is a serious inconsistency bet-
ween the stated goals of the juvenile justice system in Indiana and the present
waiver law. This inconsistency needs to be rectified either by adopting a new
philosophy for our juvenile system or by an amendment to the present waiver
law so that it no longer conflicts with the present doctrine, parens patriae.
JACQUELINE SIMMONS
"°IND. CODE § 51-5-7-14(b) (1976).
811d.
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